In a recent article published in Foreign Affairs magazine, Paul Scharre analyzed the advancement in military technology and why the illusion of Western dominance and America's technological edge is fading. One of the main reasons is the use of disruptive technologies, which was displayed during the war with Iran. Of these disruptive technologies, drone warfare has emerged as the game changer. As stated by Paul Scharre, the fundamental nature of warfare is being upended by the proliferation of cheap, uncrewed systems. The U.S. military, long accustomed to building and operating a small number of exquisitely expensive platforms like the F-35 or E-3 Sentry, is now facing an enemy that can field vast numbers of low-cost, expendable drones and missiles. This transformation is not just about tactics but about basic military economics.
Cost Asymmetry: Cheap Drones vs. Expensive Hardware
In the Gulf conflict, Iranian missiles struck five KC-135 Stratotanker refueling aircraft and destroyed one E-3 Sentry aircraft, a loss that is even greater than its $300 million cost, given that the fleet is down to only 15 planes with a replacement program years away. This dynamic is even more stark in Ukraine, where a $300,000 kamikaze drone boat can cripple a navy warship costing hundreds of millions of dollars. Ukraine has used this asymmetric approach to devastating effect, sinking 13 Russian ships and damaging dozens more. The cost-exchange ratio heavily favors the attacker using cheap drones; for example, intercepting a $35,000 Shahed drone with a $4 million Patriot missile is a Pyrrhic victory that depletes expensive U.S. stockpiles.
Autonomous Drones and the Rise of Robot Swarms
Drones are not static threats. They are evolving rapidly with greater autonomy. In Ukraine, drones already have autonomous terminal guidance to navigate to a target if the signal is jammed, and long-range strike drones can navigate autonomously without GPS by matching onboard images to satellite imagery. The next step is the intelligent swarm: thousands of drones reacting in real time to changing conditions, hunting mobile targets, and overwhelming defenses with coordinated attacks. This represents a paradigm shift, moving from remotely piloted vehicles to autonomous 'robot swarms' that require a radical rethinking of military command and control, replacing hierarchical structures with decentralized ones.
Underground Fortifications and the New Battlefield
The war has driven both sides underground, but the nature of shelter has evolved dramatically. Ukraine has created the 'New Donbas Line', a massive 350-kilometer fortification network across Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts. This system features at least seven distinct defensive layers with anti-tank ditches, dragon's teeth obstacles, and multiple rows of barbed wire. The system is deliberately dispersed, using platoon-level strongpoints connected by zigzag trenches with concealed firing positions, rather than a continuous linear 'wall'. Russian forces have also gone underground in significant numbers. On the left bank of Kherson Oblast, Russian troops have built an extensive tunnel network stretching 30–40 kilometers, with personnel movement, artillery positions, and drone launch pads all concentrated underground, reportedly following a 'Hamas pattern' similar to Gaza's tunnel city.
Survival on the Front Lines: From Camouflage to Burrows
However, this underground protection is under severe threat. The priority has shifted from concrete to camouflage, decoys, anti-drone netting, and concealment from aerial detection. On the front lines, conditions have become extreme. The 'kill zone', a strip ranging from 500 meters to 6–7 kilometers wide where trenches and shelters are intermixed, has become a deadly maze. Soldiers live in single 'burrows' (hastily dug depressions) or small shelters measuring 2–4 square meters, accommodating 1–3 people. Some fighters remain in these positions for dozens of days, unable to rotate out due to the extreme danger of movement.
Adaptation: Infantry Infiltration and Improvised Armor
Both sides are adapting to a battlefield where drones dominate, massed armor is suicidal, and artillery must constantly reposition to survive. The massed armored assaults of 2022 are largely a thing of the past. Russian forces have almost completely abandoned large-scale mechanized attacks with tanks and armored vehicles in favor of small infantry infiltration groups of one to three soldiers using camouflage and terrain to avoid Ukrainian drone kill zones. When armored vehicles are used, they are typically employed as indirect-fire artillery platforms, bombarding the enemy from a distance rather than closing for assault. For the armor that does go forward, survivability depends on improvisation. Russian forces are equipping their artillery systems, including 2S19 Msta-S howitzers and BM-27 Uragan MLRS, with makeshift 'cope cages' (metal mesh frameworks) and electronic warfare antennas to disrupt drone guidance. Some units have resorted to stacking wooden logs along vehicle hulls as improvised armor. Both sides now use cage armor and anti-drone nets, but Ukrainian analysis notes that these screens are not reliable. Loitering munitions can strike from the side or rear, not just from above, and direct hits still destroy the vehicle.
Artillery and Networked Warfare: The Ukrainian Advantage
Artillery remains decisive, responsible for the majority of casualties, but the dynamics have fundamentally changed. The key tactical principle is shoot-and-scoot: fire and immediately displace before counter-battery fire or drones can strike back. Ukraine has achieved a significant advantage through networked warfare. The 'Kropyva' combat system integrates reconnaissance, control, and fire destruction into a single information network. Using tablets with GPS and mapping software, artillery batteries can reduce deployment time by five times, time to hit unplanned targets by three times, and counter-battery response time by ten times. Starlink satellite communications provide stable internet connectivity, allowing real-time coordination even when mobile towers are destroyed.
Decentralized Command and Small Unit Tactics
Perhaps the most significant tactical adaptation is the dispersion of forces and the shift towards decentralized command. Ukraine has embraced the principles of Mission Command: central planning but decentralized execution, where junior commanders understand their superiors' intent and act without waiting for orders. Russian forces have adapted by deploying small, mobile assault groups on motorcycles, buggies, or even crawling under camouflage anti-thermal imaging cloaks, moving only at night, dawn, or dusk to avoid drone detection. These infiltration teams often bypass first-line defenses entirely, attempting to push deep into Ukrainian positions to create chaos and disrupt logistics.
Adeela Naureen and Waqar K Kauravi, the authors, are freelance journalists. They can be reached at adeelanaureen@gmail.com and waqarkauravi@gmail.com.
