Iran's Decades-Long Strategy to Weaponize the Strait of Hormuz
Long before the United States and Israel launched attacks against Iran, the Islamic Republic had developed a potent weapon: leveraging the world's primary oil lifeline to counterbalance its adversaries' military advantages. According to three regional sources with knowledge of Iranian planning, Tehran has for decades signaled that if forced into a confrontation, it would restrict tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. This strategic chokepoint represents a critical vulnerability for Iran's foes, as any disruption there sends immediate shockwaves through global energy markets.
The Economic Deterrent in Action
With the Gulf's main export artery under threat, Iran has transformed the region's greatest economic asset into its most powerful deterrent. Approximately one-fifth of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas typically passes through the vital Strait, and Iran, situated on its northern coast, has now effectively closed it. United Nations data reveals that traffic via the strait has plummeted by 97% since the war against Iran commenced on February 28.
This tactic is not entirely new for Iran. During the "Tanker War" of the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq conflict, attacks on vessels rendered the Gulf one of the world's most perilous waterways, compelling Washington to escort tankers through the Strait. However, Iran now possesses far more advanced capabilities, including extensive arsenals of inexpensive missiles and drones that can threaten shipping across a broader area.
Asymmetric Warfare and Global Impact
Recent attacks this month have demonstrated Tehran's ability to swiftly disrupt strait traffic without resorting to extensive mining operations. Ali Vaez, the International Crisis Group's Iran Project Director, noted, "Iran is outgunned—there is no way it can defeat them in a direct confrontation." In anticipation of further U.S.-Israeli strikes following a 12-day war in June last year, Tehran explored methods to prolong any conflict "in time and space." Vaez added, "If Iran takes the global economy hostage, Trump would blink first."
The regional sources, who requested anonymity due to lack of authorization to speak publicly, indicated that Iran's powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) had long prepared for a showdown with Israel and Washington. This plan, aimed at safeguarding Iran's 47-year-old system of rule by anti-Western Islamic clerics, was activated on February 28, after Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed on the conflict's first day.
Core Strategy and Decentralized Doctrine
At the heart of this strategy is an acknowledgment of Iran's military limitations against superior forces. Instead, Tehran's planners focus on pressuring oil flows while executing asymmetric attacks on U.S. assets stationed across the region. Michael Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute explained, "This is asymmetric warfare par excellence, in which Iran achieves outsized, even global effects through a small number of attacks that impose painful costs. The goal is to create economic pain, further undermining support for the war in the United States and increasing pressure on Washington to end it."
Rather than concentrating forces on a single battlefield, Tehran is dispersing its campaign with waves of low-cost missile and drone strikes across the Gulf, a tactic once delegated to Iran-allied forces in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. This approach reflects a doctrine shaped over decades by the IRGC, predicated on the assumption that a stronger adversary would attempt to decapitate Iran's leadership and command structure at the onset of any war.
Lessons from Shadow Conflicts and Current Execution
The Guards are applying insights gleaned from years of shadow conflict with the U.S. This time, however, instead of relying predominantly on regional proxies that previously formed its forward line of defense, Tehran is executing the playbook directly. Ali Vaez criticized the U.S. for entering the war unprepared, driven by "a lot of wishful thinking and not a lot of well-thought-through strategies." He pointed out that Washington failed to anticipate drone attacks on Gulf states, disruptions to shipping lanes, or the necessity of evacuating citizens, shortcomings he attributed to a failure to learn from the risks posed by drones in modern warfare.
In contrast, Iran's decentralized "Mosaic" doctrine—which disperses command and control to withstand decapitation—remains operational under a single coordinating hub. Even after Khamenei's death, two sources confirmed that Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, a former Guards commander, and Ali Larijani, head of Iran's national security council, continue to direct the war effort from Tehran.
