Syria has turned to Russia as its primary oil supplier, according to Reuters data, despite the new government's alignment with Western nations and widespread distrust of Moscow for its military backing of ousted leader Bashar Assad.
Surge in Russian Oil Imports
Oil shipments from Russia to Syria have jumped 75 percent to approximately 60,000 barrels per day in 2026, based on Reuters calculations using official announcements and ship tracking data from LSEG, MarineTraffic, and Shipnext. While these volumes represent a small fraction of Russia's global oil exports, they make Moscow the dominant crude supplier for Syria after the fall of Assad in December 2024, replacing Iran, which had been a key ally during the 14-year civil war.
Limited Options for Syria
This dynamic underscores Syria's constrained choices. Despite emerging from the war with a Western-leaning posture, its economy remains poorly integrated into the global financial system, even after Europe and the United States lifted decades-long sanctions last year. Two analysts and three Syrian officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the trade reflects economic necessity and grants Moscow influence in a country where it retains two naval and air bases. However, this relationship risks straining ties with the EU and Washington, as Damascus currently has few alternatives.
Syrian economist Karam Shaar warned that the trade could expose Syria's energy sector to renewed Western sanctions. "If the United States fails to reach an agreement with Russia regarding Ukraine, it wouldn't be surprising if it told Syria overnight to stop buying these oil shipments," Shaar said, adding that the Syrian government is aware of the risks and is seeking alternative suppliers.
Efforts to Diversify Suppliers
An official at the state-run Syrian Petroleum Company (SPC) said Damascus is trying to diversify and has unsuccessfully sought an oil deal with Turkiye, which is close to the Sharaa government. Maritime analytics firm SynMax noted that financial constraints, commercial risks, and years of conflict limit Syria's access to conventional tanker operators, leaving Russian-linked networks among the most viable options. "These shipping networks could present reputational challenges for Syria as it seeks to re-establish commercial credibility," SynMax said, but added that "a transition toward conventional international supply chains is unlikely to occur immediately."
Neither the Syrian nor Russian energy ministries responded to requests for comment. The US State Department declined to comment on Syria's oil trade with Russia. In response to the war in Iran, the US Treasury has issued temporary waivers for countries to buy sanctioned Russian oil and petroleum products already at sea. Syria's Ministry of Information also did not respond.
Economic Constraints and Market Size
A Syrian energy ministry official said Syria's reliance on Russian oil also stems from its limited market size and weak purchasing power, making it difficult to secure long-term contracts with other major producers like Gulf countries. The Central Bank of Syria only reactivated its account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in March, opening opportunities for wider banking communications with the global financial system for the first time since 2011.
Russia First to Supply Oil After Assad's Fall
Russia was the first to send a tanker to Syria after Assad fell, supplying 16.8 million barrels in 2025 (about 46,000 barrels per day) through 19 cargoes shipped between February 28 and December 31, according to Kpler data and one official. This has risen to an estimated 60,000 barrels per day in 2026. Reuters tracked 21 vessels, all under Western sanctions, arriving at Syrian ports from Russia almost weekly.
This marks a sharp break from previous years when Iran was Syria's dominant crude supplier, while Russia's role was limited to occasional diesel shipments. Kpler data shows all crude imports in 2024 (about 22.2 million barrels) came from Iran, which halted supplies after Assad's fall. Despite the government regaining control of oil fields in eastern Syria, domestic production remains limited. The largest field, Al-Omar in Deir Ezzor, produces about 5,000 barrels per day, while total domestic output stood at roughly 35,000 bpd in 2025, far below pre-war levels of 350,000 bpd.
Syria's daily oil and fuel needs are estimated at between 120,000 and 150,000 barrels, according to SPC and energy ministry officials. Additional volumes (about 50,000 bpd) are smuggled from Lebanon, which imports oil from various sources including Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. The gap of about a third of domestic demand is covered by Russian shipments. Contracts were booked prior to the Iran war price shock and bought at a discount to benchmark Brent crude prices, according to an official at the Syrian Company for Oil Transport.
Domestic Sensitivity Over Russian Oil
Syrian authorities announce oil shipments in state media but do not disclose their origin, seemingly recognizing that Russia is unpopular domestically due to its military support for the Assad government. The only delivery identified was from Saudi Arabia in November, described as a grant. Syrian officials acknowledge that the fate of Russian bases often features in discussions between Damascus and Western capitals. US Republican congressman Joe Wilson posted on X in April, "Syria should do the right thing and what the majority of Syrians support and kick them out."
Sanctioned Vessels and Ship-to-Ship Transfers
At Syria's Mediterranean terminals, the trade is handled by a rotating fleet tied to Russia's network of sanctioned or high-risk tankers, operating under multiple flags including Panama, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Comoros, Madagascar, Oman, and Russia, LSEG data shows. Part of the supply chain involves ship-to-ship transfers near Greece, Cyprus, or Egypt, according to SynMax analysis. Such transfers reduce transportation costs or evade sanctions by obscuring cargo origin and ownership. "The ship-to-ship operations indicate that the United States is not totally turning a blind eye, and that Syrian and Russian authorities are at least trying to conceal some shipments," Shaar said.
The Comoros-flagged Albarraq Z, sanctioned by the US in January for alleged ties to Iran-backed Houthi networks, appeared to take on oil via three transfers at sea with ships from Russian ports before anchoring off Syria's Tartous, where draft changes suggested cargo discharge, according to SynMax. Reuters could not establish the purpose of the transfers. Some vessels are tied to Iranian-linked trading networks also used by Russia. The Guinea-flagged Aether and Madagascar-flagged Briont were sanctioned by the US Treasury in 2025 for links to a network associated with Hossein Shamkhani, son of a top adviser to the former Iranian Supreme Leader. Both showed irregular tracking behavior, with Aether transmitting intermittently and Briont broadcasting under another vessel's identity.
Syria has used such transfers partly because these are the logistics networks officials are familiar with after years excluded from normal shipping networks, one source said. Other ships appear more directly linked to Russian logistics. The Oman-flagged Carma and Lynx are owned by a UAE-based company linked to Russia's state shipping giant Sovcomflot, according to analyses by Lloyd's List and Kharon. The Comoros-flagged Grinch, detained by France in February, has been sanctioned by US and EU since last year for links to Russia's fleet exporting oil from Murmansk. Reuters could not independently verify vessel ownership.
Noam Raydan, a maritime risk and energy analyst at the Washington Institute, warned, "The question is who are the sanctioned actors that are actually benefiting from this trade."
