The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), formed in 1968 and enforced in 1970, emerged after years of deadlock over its three fundamental pillars: non-proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and nuclear disarmament. Major nuclear weapons states, now known as the P-5, pledged to pursue disarmament but failed to fulfill their promise of complete disarmament, even after the treaty's indefinite extension at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. Strategic realities of international politics overshadowed these commitments.
Despite fears of widespread proliferation, only nine nuclear-weapon states exist today. However, aspirant states were often prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons through forceful measures by the United States or preventive strikes by others, such as Israel and the U.S. Israel preemptively struck nuclear facilities in Iraq, Syria, and recently Iran, citing existential threats, while remaining the sole nuclear power in the region and rejecting a proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. This contributed to the failure of NPT Review Conferences.
The United States allowed only the United Kingdom and France to retain nuclear weapons, promoting non-proliferation through a nuclear umbrella for allies and maintaining security dominance. The NPT remains weak, failing to prevent nuclear-weapon states from attacking non-nuclear parties to the treaty, creating a dangerous precedent between the "haves" and "have-nots." The treaty's foundation is discriminatory, recognizing only states that acquired nuclear capability before 1967 as nuclear-weapon states.
There is no clear evidence of disarmament anywhere. The U.S. and Russia possess nearly 90% of global nuclear forces. All major nuclear states are modernizing and expanding their arsenals, with emerging technologies integrated into both conventional and nuclear domains. Except for China, recognized nuclear states maintain first-use doctrines. The deterrent value of nuclear weapons remains paramount, as seen in cases like Ukraine, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya versus North Korea, which developed a credible deterrent after leaving the NPT.
In South Asia, Pakistan's nuclear capability has established strategic balance against India. Pakistan's Full-Spectrum Deterrence has deterred large-scale and limited war. Given these realities, disarmament is unlikely. Arms control agreements like the ABM Treaty, INF Treaty, and New START have eroded, incentivizing further modernization. More states may seek nuclear weapons for security, while existing powers expand their arsenals.
Pakistan should maintain its nuclear deterrent, avoid joining the NPT or NSGT under conditions requiring relinquishment, and advocate for structural reforms. It should not join the NPT even if India does so without nuclear weapons due to conventional asymmetry. Pakistan should support universal principles of equity, transparency, and non-discrimination regarding the NPT's pillars. The upcoming NPT Review Conference is unlikely to achieve major objectives, including a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone and complete disarmament.
