India's Unilateral Suspension of Indus Waters Treaty
On 22nd April 2025, 26 tourists were gunned down in the Baisaran meadow of Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir. Without any investigation or evidence, India blamed Pakistan. The following day, India unilaterally put the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 in abeyance, citing national security concerns and alleged Pakistani support for state-sponsored terrorism. This suspension marks a severe and unprecedented act against one of the world's most resilient water-sharing agreements.
For over six decades, the IWT endured diplomatic breakdowns, violent escalations, and full-scale wars between India and Pakistan, including those in 1965, 1971, and the Kargil conflict of 1999. It survived surging nationalism on both sides without being seriously questioned. Its faltering now signals a shift not only in bilateral relations but also in regional geopolitics and the management of shared water resources.
Background of the Indus Waters Treaty
Signed in 1960 with World Bank mediation, the IWT divided the Indus River System between India and Pakistan. Pakistan gained control over the western tributaries (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab), while India controlled the eastern ones (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej). For Pakistan, the treaty guaranteed vital irrigation and energy resources, forming the backbone of its economy and food security. For India, exclusive rights over eastern rivers allowed expansion of irrigation networks, water infrastructure, and hydropower development.
Chenab-Beas Link Tunnel Project
On 20th May 2026, India floated tenders for the Chenab-Beas Link Tunnel project in Lahaul-Spiti. The plan involves an 8.7 km tunnel with a 4.3 m diameter to divert approximately 2 million acre-feet (MAF) of water from the Chandra River, a main tributary of the Chenab, eastward into the Beas basin. Taking advantage of the IWT's abeyance, India ignored the United Nations Watercourses Convention of 1997, the Vienna Convention of 1969, and the IWT's dispute resolution frameworks.
The Chenab's annual flow entering Pakistan at Head Marala is around 25 MAF (31 billion cubic meters). A 2 MAF diversion represents 5% of this flow, which may seem small but is only the beginning. If completed by 2029, it would seriously affect Pakistani Punjab, especially during low-flow seasons when new crops are harvested. This diversion could impact 0.5-1 million acres of cropland. Punjab accounts for 57% of Pakistan's cultivated land and 69% of its total cropped area.
Hydropower Projects on Chenab
India currently has at least 10 major hydropower projects on the Chenab. Three are operational (Salal, Baglihar, Dulhasti) producing around 2,000 MW. Four are under construction, and three are proposed. If all become operational, the Chenab basin on the Indian side would have over 8,000 MW of installed capacity. Although India classifies these as run-of-the-river projects, Pakistan maintains that storage and operational control can adversely affect flows to Pakistan, threatening its food security.
Policy Options for Pakistan
The Pakistani government must recognize the gravity of the situation. An inter-governmental committee, headed by the Prime Minister and including all stakeholders, should assess the issue and identify options. The strongest non-military option is to challenge the IWT's unilateral abeyance through international law. Approaching the World Bank, United Nations, ICJ, and other relevant forums with international experts would legitimize Pakistan's stance, create scrutiny, and lower the risk of military escalation.
Pakistan should also launch a diplomatic offensive, highlighting water and food security, regional stability, climate impact, and treaty compliance across world capitals. Briefing OIC, SCO, BRICS, EU, and other forums on the consequences of India's actions is critical. Investment in technical monitoring and evidence collection—using satellite data, telemetry, hydrological audits by international firms—is essential to support Pakistan's case.
Even if India reactivates the IWT, Pakistan remains dependent on the Indus basin. Climate change is affecting glaciers, and population growth increases food security concerns. Therefore, Pakistan must implement measures such as lining canals, modernizing irrigation, drip irrigation, groundwater management, building new dams, and crop diversification.
India must realize that if its weaponization of water threatens Pakistan's survival, a major military conflict may ensue. No sovereign nation can allow its people to perish due to bullying and illegal actions. After the lessons of May 2025, India should revert to talks and negotiate all outstanding disputes. History is watching, as are 1.7 billion people.
Aamir Zulfiqar Khan is a senior public policy expert who has served as Inspector General of Police in Punjab, Islamabad, and National Highway & Motorways Police. He can be reached at amzkhan.lhr@gmail.com.
